The Vermont Department of Labor has ruled an employer/carrier is not responsible for paying for treatment provided by an unlicensed or uncertified provider if Vermont law requires that only a licensed or certified practitioner can provide a particular type of medical service. Myrick v. Ormond Bushey and Sons, Op. No. 07-14 WC (April 25, 2014).
The workers' compensation statute requires the employer to pay for reasonable medical services caused by a work injury, provided they were "lawfully delivered medical services." Id. (citing 21 V.S.A. §640). If a practitioner is not required to be licensed or certified to provide treatment under Vermont law, then the employer may be responsible for paying a charge for service. V.O. Windsor Hospital, Op. No. 12-08 WC (March 27, 2008)(citing 21 V.S.A. §640(a)).
Additionally, the decision reaffirms that an employer is not obligated to to pay charges of a provider who fails to maintain treatment records or submit appropriately documented medical bills. Myrick v. Ormond Bushey and Sons, Op. No. 07-14 WC (April 25, 2014).
The Vermont Workers' Compensation Bulletin is a collection of materials and information related to workers' compensation in Vermont and the Vermont Department of Labor. Founded in 2013, it is edited, condensed, and digested by Erin J. Gilmore, Esq.
Tuesday, April 29, 2014
Monday, April 28, 2014
Lent Employee Doctrine Revisited
The lent employee doctrine occurs when one employer, the
general employer, lends an employee to another employer, the special employer. The
presumption is that employment continues under the general employer and the
general employer remains liable for injuries suffered by the employee. See Thorn v. Albany Ladder, Op.
No. 17-02WC (Apr. 2, 2002) (citing 3 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law
§67.03). This presumption may be overcome if there is “a clear demonstration
that a new temporary employer has been substituted for the old.” Id. In order for the special employer to become liable: “[T]here must
be a contract of hire, express or implied between the special employer and
employee. . . . This involves an informed consent by the
employee before the employment-relation can be said to exist. This requirement
being met, there remains the necessity of showing that the work being done is
essentially that of the special employer and lastly that such special employer
has the right to control the details of the work.” Mercier v. Holmes,
119 Vt. 368, 375 (1956).
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